Coalition formation has been documented in a diverse array of taxa, yet there has been little formal analysis of polyadic interactions such as coalitions. Here, we develop an optimality model which examines the role of winner and loser e¡ects in shaping coalition formation. We demonstrate that the predicted patterns of alliances are strongly dependent on the way in which winner and loser e¡ects change with contestant strength. When winner and loser e¡ects decrease with the resource-holding power (RHP) of the combatants, coalitions will be favoured between the strongest members of a group, but not between the weakest. If, in contrast, winner and loser e¡ects increase with RHP, exactly the opposite predictions emerge. All other things being equal, intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the bene¢ciary of the aid is weaker (and its opponent is stronger), because the bene¢ciary is then less likely to win without help. Consequently, intervention is more probable when the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a combatant increases with that individual's strength because this selects for intervention in favour of weaker combatants. The published literature on hierarchy formation does not reveal how winner and loser e¡ects actually change with contestant strength and we therefore hope that our model will spur others to collect such data; in this light we suggest an experiment which will help to elucidate the nature of winner and loser e¡ects and their impact on coalition formation in animals.
INTRODUCTION
Even in the most cooperative animal societies, aggression often plays an important role. For example, in eusocial naked mole-rats, cooperative and altruistic acts are quite common. Yet, despite an average relatedness of rˆ0.81 within colonies (Reeve et al. 1990) , aggression is a theme underlying much behaviour within naked mole-rat colonies (Reeve & Sherman 1991; Sherman et al. 1991) . In the light of such ¢ndings, it is not surprising that behavioural biologists have a keen interest in studying the evolution of aggression and can trace work in this area back at least as far as Schjelderup-Ebbe's (1922) pioneering work on dominance hierarchies in chickens.
Behavioural ecologists interested in the evolution of aggression have, for the most part, focused on pairwise aggressive interactions. Over the last 20 years a series of mathematical models has examined what variables may best correlate with victory in pairwise contests and numerous empirical studies have put such models to the test (see Riechert (1998) for a review). Other models of the evolution of aggression have focused on how pairwise interactions a¡ect the structure of dominance hierarchies. In such models, pairwise interactions are incorporated in order to understand group-level phenomena such as hierarchies better (Riechert 1998) . However, there is a third, somewhat intermediate level at which aggression can be studied: polyadic interaction (Harcourt & De Waal 1992) .
Three (or more) individuals are involved in polyadic aggressive interactions. Perhaps the most widely discussed type of polyadic relationship is the coalition. In coalitions, the result of a two-party aggressive interaction is a¡ected by a third individual who aids one of the other interactants, such that the aided party is subsequently more likely to emerge victorious. Coalitions have been documented in primates (Chapais 1992; Harcourt & De Waal 1992) , hyenas (Crocuta crocuta; Zabel et al. 1992) , wolves (Canis lupus; Fentress et al. 1986) , lions (Panthera leo; Packer & Pusey 1982) , cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus; Caro 1994), coatis (Nasura narica; Russell 1983 ) and dolphins (Tursiops trucatus; Connor et al. 1992 Connor et al. , 1999 . What function coalitions serve is still a matter of debate. Their purported functions include supporting kin, reducing`social disruption', the formation of alliances and the promotion of group cohesion (see Ehardt & Bernstein (1992) for a review), but there is no clear consensus on which if any of these underlies coalition formation.
Recently, Dugatkin (1998) presented the ¢rst formal model of coalition formation, focusing on a trio of individuals (a, b and g) and assuming that an individual's probability of future wins and losses is a¡ected by the outcome of its past interactions, i.e. that`winner' and loser' e¡ects are in operation (such e¡ects have been widely reported) (e.g. Alexander 1961; Frey & Miller 1972; Burk 1979; Van de Poll et al. 1982; Bakker & Sevenster 1983; Francis 1983 Francis , 1987 Beacham & Newman 1987; Beacham 1988; Bakker et al. 1989; Beaugrand et al. 1991 Beaugrand et al. , 1996 Drummond & Osorno 1992; Zucker & Murray 1996; Drummond & Canales 1998; Hsu & Wolf 1999) . In Dugatkin's (1998) model, winner e¡ects were de¢ned as an increased probability of winning at time T + 1 given a victory at time T, while loser e¡ects entailed an increased probability of losing at time T + 1 given a loss at time T. Dugatkin's (1998) model revealed that, under certain conditions, winner and loser e¡ects both favour coalition formation. Increasing the strength of loser e¡ects or winner e¡ects or the strength of an individual's position in the hierarchy makes coalition formation more likely in general, while increasing the costs of giving aid does the opposite. A more counter-intuitive result was that reciprocal coalition formation was possible between a (the highest ranked individual) and b (the second ranked individual) or between a and g (the lowest ranked individual), yet reciprocal aid giving between b and g was never favoured.
Here we show that, although these results are valid, they are contingent upon the speci¢c form of winner and loser e¡ects assumed in Dugatkin's (1998) model, in particular the assumption that the magnitude of these e¡ects decreases with the strength of the individual in question. We develop a more general model of the impact of winner and loser e¡ects and examine how alternative assumptions a¡ect coalition formation (it is not the evolution of winner and loser e¡ects themselves with which we are concerned, but their in£uence on patterns of intervention). We show that the predicted pattern of alliances is strongly dependent on the way in which these e¡ects vary with resource-holding power (RHP), which is a measure of ¢ghting ability (Parker 1974; Maynard Smith & Parker 1976; Parker & Rubenstein 1981) and go on to suggest, on this basis, experiments which will help to elucidate the nature of coalition formation in animals. Dugatkin (1998) outlined a simple model of coalition formation which focuses on a group of three individuals. Within this group, dyadic contests occur at random and each interaction may provide an opportunity for the uninvolved third individual to intervene. Intervention in favour of one of the contestants ensures victory for the recipient of such aid; in the absence of intervention, the probability that individual i defeats individual j is given by p ij (ˆ17p ji )51. The ¢tness pay-o¡ to individual i from winning a ¢ght will be denoted B i and the (additive) ¢tness cost to intervening in a con£ict between others C i .
A GENERAL MODEL OF INTERVENTION
Winning or losing a ¢ght may in£uence the winner's (or loser's) probability of victory in their next encounter with the uninvolved third individual (who has the opportunity to intervene). If the probability of individual i defeating opponent j is equal to p ij in the absence of any winner or loser e¡ects, then their probability of winning following a victory will be denoted V( p ij )4p ij and their probability of winning following a loss will be denoted L( p ij )5p ij . Dugatkin (1998) focused on the speci¢c case in which V( p ij )ˆp ij + w(17p ij ) and L( p ij )ˆp ij 7l(17p ij ), where w and l are positive constants which determine the magnitudes of the winner and loser e¡ects, respectively (with large values denoting strong e¡ects). However, at this stage we will avoid specifying any particular functions V( p) and L(p) in order to determine more generally the conditions under which di¡erent strategies of intervention are favoured (we assume only that both V(p) and L(p) are strictly increasing in p, i.e. that the greater an individual's chance of defeating a particular opponent in the absence of any winner or loser e¡ects, the greater their chance of doing so following a victory or a defeat).
(a) In whose favour should one intervene?
When a ¢ght occurs between individuals j and k, the remaining group member i has three options: aid j, aid k or refrain from intervening in the con£ict. If i chooses to aid j, i's expected pay-o¡ from the next con£ict in which i is involved is given by
If i chooses to aid k, i's expected pay-o¡ is given by
Finally, if i refrains from intervention, the expected payo¡ is given by
Now, comparing expressions (1) and (2), it is clear that i does better to aid j rather than k if and only if
In other words, i should aid j if and only if winning (rather than losing) the ¢ght will have a smaller impact on j's subsequent chance of defeating i than it would on k's subsequent chance of defeating i. Condition (4) will hold whenever j is stronger than k (i.e. p ji 4p ki ), provided that
i.e. provided that the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a contestant decreases with that contestant's strength. Dugatkin's (1998) functions V( p ij )ˆp ij + w(17p ij ) and L( p ij )ˆp ij 7l(17p ij ) both satisfy condition (5), either alone or in combination. As a result, they naturally lead to his prediction that individuals should intervene in favour of stronger contestants, precluding reciprocal coalition formation between the two weaker members of the group (note that the reciprocal aid-giving we discuss here is distinct from conditional reciprocal strategies, such as tit-for-tat, which assume that i's behaviour towards j depends on j's previous interactions with i; no such dependence exists in our model). However, alternative representations of winner and loser e¡ects yield di¡erent predictions. For instance, the functions V( p ij )ˆp ij + wp ij and L( p ij )ˆp ij 7lp ij (where large values of w and l once again indicate strong winner or loser e¡ects) imply that the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a contestant increases (rather than decreases) with that contestant's strength. Consequently, they yield the opposite prediction to Dugatkin (1998) , namely that individuals should intervene in favour of weaker contestants. This not only allows for reciprocal coalition formation between the two weakest members of the group, but precludes coalitions between the two strongest members.
(b) When is intervention worthwhile?
Assuming that individual i does better to intervene in favour of j rather than k, we can deduce from expressions (1) and (3) that intervention is favoured over restraint whenever
which may be rearranged to yield the following condition:
(given our assumption that i does best to intervene in favour of j, condition (4) implies that the left-hand side of the above expression must be positive). Inspection of condition (7) leads us to concur with Dugatkin (1998) that intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the costs involved are lower and the bene¢ts of retaining status (i.e. of winning ¢ghts) are higher.
The only other conclusion one may draw from condition (7) is that, all other things being equal (i.e. holding winner and loser e¡ects constant), intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the bene¢ciary of the aid is weaker (and their opponent is stronger). The reason for this prediction is that a weaker bene¢ciary (or one facing a stronger opponent) is less likely to win without help; consequently, there is more to be gained by intervening. One interesting implication of this is that intervention is more probable when the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a contestant increases with that contestant's strength, because this selects for intervention in favour of weaker contestants.
(c) A comparison of models
The above point can be nicely illustrated by a comparison between Dugatkin's (1998) winner and loser e¡ect functions V( p ij )ˆp ij + w(17p ij ) and L(p ij )ˆp ij 7l(17p ij ), which imply that the impact of victory decreases with strength, and the alternative functions suggested above, V(p ij )ˆp ij + wp ij and L( p ij )ˆp ij 7lp ij , which imply that the impact of victory increases with strength.
As stated above, Dugatkin's (1998) functions favour intervention in support of the stronger rather than the weaker contestant. Assuming that j is stronger than k, substitution of these functions into condition (7) yields the following condition for intervention (by individual i) to be favoured:
Individual i does better to intervene if and only if the combined magnitude of the winner and loser e¡ects (w + l) exceeds the critical value given in condition (8).
In contrast, the alternative functions favour intervention in support of the weaker rather than the stronger contestant. An equivalent calculation, taking this fact into account (and again assuming that j is stronger than k), yields the following condition for intervention (by individual i) to be favoured:
Once again, individual i does better to intervene if and only if the combined magnitude of the winner and loser e¡ects (w + l) exceeds some critical value. However, since j is stronger than k, p jk is greater than (17p jk ), which implies that the critical value speci¢ed by condition (9) is lower than that speci¢ed by condition (8). In other words, intervention is more likely to be favoured when the impact of victory increases rather than decreases with a contestant's strength.
DISCUSSION
The present model reveals that understanding the nature of the winner and loser functions is essential if one is to make speci¢c predictions regarding intervention behaviour. Dugatkin's (1998) conclusion that individuals should intervene in favour of stronger contestants (precluding reciprocal coalition formation between the two weaker members of the group) simply re£ects his assumption that such contestants will bene¢t less from a victory in terms of future competitive success (and will su¡er less from a loss). Reversing this assumption leads to the opposite prediction that individuals should intervene in favour of weaker contestants because it is now these contestants which bene¢t less from victory (and su¡er less from a loss).
Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the relationship between strength and the impact of victory or loss will always be monotonic or that it will be the same for both the winners and losers. It seems possible, for instance, that a victory might have the greatest impact on contestants of intermediate strength (if very weak or very strong individuals are likely to always win or always lose regardless of past experience). Equally, the fact that the winner e¡ects increase with strength in some particular case need not imply that loser e¡ects do so also.
Given these more complex possibilities, it is essential to determine the nature of the winner^loser e¡ects in any particular context. Only then can one apply the present model's general prediction that i should aid j rather than k if and only if winning (rather than losing) the ¢ght will have a smaller impact on j's subsequent chance of defeating i than it would on k's subsequent chance of defeating i (which will depend on the combination of winner and loser e¡ects).
Regarding the expected pay-o¡ for intervention, the model suggests that this will tend to be greater if the winner and loser e¡ects increase (rather then decrease) with strength, so that selection favours helping weaker contestants. We might thus expect to ¢nd winner^loser functions of this form in the majority of cases in which intervention is reported. However, care must be taken when testing this prediction since there are a number of Coalition formation R. A. Johnstone and L. A. Dugatkin 19 potential confounding factors which in£uence the probability of coalition formation, e.g. the value of the resource contested, the cost of ¢ghting and intervening and the magnitudeöfor any given level of strengthöof the winner and loser e¡ects.
Turning to the published literature on winner and loser e¡ects, we could ¢nd no controlled study whose experimental protocol allowed us to distinguish between di¡erent V and L functions (Alexander 1961; Frey & Miller 1972; Burk 1979; Van de Poll et al. 1982; Bakker & Sevenster 1983; Francis 1983 Francis , 1987 Beacham & Newman 1987; Beacham 1988; Bakker et al. 1989; Beaugrand et al. 1991 Beaugrand et al. , 1996 Drummond & Osorno 1992; Zucker & Murray 1996; Drummond & Canales 1998; Hsu & Wolf 1999 ; see also Beaugrand & Zayan (1985) for more on older, less-controlled studies of`prior experience'). Although previous studies have provided important information on winner^loser e¡ects, the results presented therein could not be analysed in such a way as to determine how such e¡ects change as a function of RHP (it is of course possible that the relevant data were collected in the studies listed above but remain unpublished; if this proves to be the case, we encourage individuals with such information to make it known). Assessment of the nature of winner and loser e¡ects (and their relationship with RHP) thus represents an essential next step in the study of coalition formation.
A simple test which future researchers might employ to gather this information is as follows. For the sake of an example, consider the case of delineating how winner e¡ects change with RHP (an analogous argument can be constructed for loser e¡ects). In our hypothetical experiment, we begin with test groups of six individuals, such that in the groups RHP 1 4RHP 2 4RHP 3ˆR HP 4 RHP 5ˆR HP 6 . We assume that, after some wellde¢ned period of time (which will vary depending on the species tested), the winner and loser e¡ects will dissipate to nil. Stage 1 would then measure the probabilities that individual 1 defeated individual 3 and that individual 2 defeated individual 4, given that no-one had prior winning experience. In stage 2, once a su¤cient time had passed such that the e¡ects of stage 1 were forgotten, individuals 1 and 2 would be provided with winning experiences (perhaps by matching them with very small opponents). Lastly, in stage 3 (immediately after stage 2) individuals 1 and 2 would be matched against individuals 5 and 6 and their probabilities of defeating such opponents would be recorded. The di¡erence in individual 1's probability of winning in stages 1 and 3 and individual 2's probability of winning in stages 1 and 3 would then be used to determine whether the winner e¡ects increase or decrease with RHP. Once the nature of the V (or L) function has been determined in this way, predictions regarding intervention behaviour can then be tested.
